This research analyzes the strategic use of targeted promotions for customer retention and acquisition in a dynamic
Marketing information technology is rapidly transforming the way in which firms conduct their marketing in service industries. Because of their unprecedented ability to gather, store, and process consumer information on a large scale at a low cost, firms are obtaining ever sharper pictures of individual consumers who have been hitherto largely anonymous and, consequently, gain much flexibility in targeting desired customers with tailored promotional incentives to achieve strategic marketing objectives.
For instance, a service firm can offer promotional incentives only to its current customers in an effort to defend its market share from competitive encroachment or accurately target its rival's customers with promotional inducements to acquire new customers. In this article, we study the strategic use of targeted promotions and characterize the optimal targeting strategies a firm can adopt in a dynamic context.
The intense rivalry between AT&T and MCI in the market for consumer long-distance telephone service provided a good example of how targeted promotions aided by information technology could help a firm to realize its strategic objectives. With a market share close to 13%, MCI launched its promotional program Friends & Family in the spring of 1990. The program was designed to attract AT&T's customers by offering substantial discounts for family-and-friends calling circles. 1 Aided by database marketing, MCI succeeded in switching at least 5 million AT&T callers by the end of 1993 and increased its market share to 19%. In response, AT&T introduced its own version of database marketing in 1994, signing more than 28 million callers to its True USA and True World saving programs to shore up its customer base, and regained close to 1 million subscribers from its competitors. In the meantime, AT&T and MCI also engaged in an expensive promotional tug-of-war by targeting each other's customers with win-back checks to induce switching. In 1994, for instance, the two firms jointly spent an estimated $1.3 billion on such checks, generating tremendous customer churning. It is estimated that consumers switched 27 million times in 1994 alone, notwithstanding the fact that both firms also offered frequency and loyalty programs. Accurate targeting of own and rival's customers with promotional incentives has clearly initiated in the industry a dynamic game of strategic promotions for customer retention and acquisition.
Using targeted promotions to retain current customers and to switch a competitor's customers is not limited to the consumer long-distance telephone service industry; indeed, it is likely to become a widespread practice in many other service industries such as banking and hospitality industries, where customer contact and recognition are prerequisite for service delivery. 2 The advent of targeted promotions thus raises many competitive and strategic issues for service managers that have not been raised before. Most of these issues are concerned not with how much to spend but with where to spend on promotions ("Briefings" 2003) . Specifically, how should a firm use targeted promotions? How should a firm respond to its rival's targeted promotions? What are the optimal targeting strategies for a firm to retain its own customers and to attract a rival's customers, given that the rival will adjust its targeting strategies over time? How do competing firms' market shares evolve over time under targeted promotions? We offer some normative answers to these important managerial questions by developing a differential game of targeted promotions.
Previous Research
Studies on targeted promotions have not addressed these questions in a dynamic context. Shaffer and Zhang (1995) , along with others, use a static game-theoretical model to explore competitive implications of targeted promotions and optimal targeting strategies. Although their static model generates many valuable insights about how targeting has changed the nature of market competition, it cannot address issues related to the dynamics of competition, especially market share implications of targeted promotions. 3 Rossi, McCulloch, and Allenby (1995) approach targeted promotions from an empirical angle by developing econometric methods for a firm to use in implementing targeted promotions.
Studies on dynamic competition in marketing are numerous but focus mostly on advertising based on the Lanchester model. Early studies in this tradition include those of Kimball (1957) , Vidale and Wolfe (1957) , Isaacs (1965) , Horsky (1977) , Little (1979) , Case (1979) , Deal (1979) , and Deal, Sethi, and Thompson (1979) . These studies examine how advertising expenditure affects sales in a dynamic setting. In recent years, much progress has been made in modeling dynamic competition in advertising, despite the fact that persistent technical difficulties remain. Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1992) and Erickson (1992) contribute valuable insights about dynamic advertising competition by applying a differential game solution to the case of the cola war and find that the closed-loop solution provides a better empirical fit than an open-loop solution. Erickson (1993) further extends his analysis to allow both offensive and defensive advertising expenditures. Because of inherent technical difficulties in solving a differential game, these previous studies have to resort to restrictive assumptions on model parameters and cannot be used directly to address questions of dynamic targeted promotions when promotional incentives are specific to groups of recipients and contingent on sales.
A related stream of literature is on customer retention as a profitable business strategy. 4 Hart, James, and Sasser (1990) and Reichheld and Sasser (1990) , for instance, forcefully advocate a focus on customer retention through investing in relationship-based assets. Although influential, such a strategic prescription obviously cannot be optimal for all firms in a competitive context because customer retention is a meaningful strategy only if customer switching by a competitor is a real threat. Indeed, McGahan and Ghemawat (1994) , using a two-stage game model, show that a larger firm can profitably focus on customer retention, whereas a smaller firm is better off focusing on customer switching. We extend the analysis on this important strategy issue to the context of targeted promotions by using a more general dynamic model, and we generate some new insights about firms' strategic orientations in equilibrium.
Study Approach and Main Results
We develop a differential game suitable for modeling dynamic targeted promotions and provide analytical solutions for both closed-loop and open-loop strategies by modifying a technique developed by Fruchter and Kalish (1997) in the context of advertising competition. We conclude that a firm's optimal targeting strategies, both offensive and defensive, in a dynamic setting depend on its actual market share, the relevant redemption rate of its tar-geted promotions, customer profitability, and the effectiveness of its targeted promotions. In the long run, a focus on customer retention cannot be an optimal strategy for all firms. A firm with a sufficiently large market share should stress customer retention, whereas a firm with a small market share should stress customer acquisition. When market shares are more evenly divided in a market, firms should all focus on customer acquisition. We illustrate through a numerical example the trajectories over time of a firm's market share, promotional expenditures, and profits as competing firms use targeted promotions optimally.
In what follows, we first set up our model. After providing analytical solutions to the model, we discuss the managerial implications of the solutions. We then conclude with suggestions for future research.
MODEL
Consider an industry where two competing firms have the capability of using targeted promotions both offensively for customer acquisition and defensively for customer retention. We restrict our analysis to a market of fixed size to focus on competition for market shares. Therefore, customer acquisition entails customer switching in our model. Without any loss of generality, we normalize the number of consumers in the market to one and thus denote a firm's demand by its market share. To introduce targeted promotions, we assume that at any point in time, both firms have adequate information to identify their own and their competitor's customers and hence can implement a different promotional program respectively for customer retention and acquisition.
Targeted promotions, unlike advertising, offer different incentives to different types of consumers, depending on a firm's marketing objectives. To retain their current customers, both AT&T and MCI, for instance, offered savings programs whereby a customer could accumulate credit points based on usage and redeem them for cash, free longdistance minutes, or frequent flier miles. They also offered win-back checks in the amount of $50 on average to bid for their competitor's customers. Therefore, to capture the essence of targeted promotions, we introduce heterogeneity in customer composition and allow a firm to tailor its promotional incentives to each identifiable group of consumers. Let x k (t) denote the market share for firm k at time t. The x k (t) consists of two types of purchases: those from repeat customers, denoted by x t k 1 ( ), and those from switching customers, denoted by x t k 2 ( ). Therefore, at any time t, we have
To model a firm's practice of using different promotional incentives to generate repeat and switching sales, let respectively. We assume that each firm makes independent promotional decisions at any time t to maximize its discounted profit stream over the planning horizon. When this planning horizon is finite, firm k's optimization problem is characterized by
() (
The constant q k represents the gross profit margin, 6 and the constant q k T represents the value of firm k's market share at the terminal time T.
Given any promotional incentives, a firm's payoffs at time t depend on how effective its targeted promotions are in generating sales. Let ρ δ
be the respective effectiveness measures of firm k's defensive and offensive promotional efforts. Here the effectiveness measure is taken as a square root function of a specific promotional expenditure, as is commonly done in the literature for tractability, and it implies a decreasing return to any promotional expenditure. The constants ρ k d and ρ k o are firm-specific effectiveness coefficients that capture the factors that affect the potency of a firm's targeted promotions such as database quality, the accuracy of data analysis and targeted delivery, customer loyalty, a firm's product characteristics, and so on. To simplify our notation, let f t f t 
A firm's market share and its composition change over time because of competitive targeted promotions, which in turn affect its promotional decisions. To capture these dynamic linkages, we specify a dynamic system as follows:
where j ≠ and k = 1, 2. Equation (5) captures the effect of targeted promotions on a firm's repeat sales. Firm k's repeat sales will increase if the firm can effectively convert switching customers to repeat purchasers through its offensive targeted promotions that overcome the rival's defensive promotions (the first term). It also increases if the firm can effectively fend off the rival's offensive targeted promotions to retain its repeat purchasers (the second term). Equation (6) indicates that firm k can acquire more new customers from competition if it can effectively tap the rival's customers through its offensive targeted promotions against the rival's defensive promotions (the first term) and/or effectively fend off the rival's offensive targeted promotions aimed at switching customers (the second term). As
Equation (7) describes the market share dynamics, and it is the well-known Lanchester dynamics modified to incorporate firms' knowledge about consumers and their ability to offer targeted promotions. This dynamic process implies that a firm's overall market share will increase if it can successfully acquire the rival's customers through its overpowering offensive targeted promotions against the rival's defensive promotions to retain them (the first term) and/or successfully fend off the rival's offensive targeted promotions and retain its current customers (the second term). This specification of dynamics is more general than Erickson's (1993). 7 For the differential game associated with equations (2), (5), and (6), we want to find closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies ( , , , )
In mathematical terms, a closed-loop strategy can be expressed as
The particular case when the strategy does not depend on the initial condition is known in the literature as feedback strategy. Both feedback and closed-loop strategies are contingent on the observed state of the system (market shares in our model) and therefore best capture the dynamic nature of competitive promotions. However, it is technically very challenging to derive an equilibrium of feedback or closed-loop strategies. An open-loop strategy is only time dependent. Such a strategy prescribes at the beginning of the game how a firm should promote at each point in time and is never revised over the course of the game. This strategy captures some realistic aspects of strategic planning in promotions; however, its wide application is due mainly to the relative ease with which one can solve differential games by using standard optimal control methods. Indeed, Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1992) and Erickson (1992) provide empirical evidence that feedback solutions fit the actual data better than open-loop solutions. Fruchter and Kalish (1997) provide similar evidence for closed-loop strategies.
As T → ∞, we can also extend the previous differential game to the case of infinite planning horizon as follows: 
with j ≠ k, k = 1, 2. It is straightforward to show that for f t kj od ( )> 0 and f t jk od ( )> 0, the steady-state solutions in equations (10) and (11) are asymptotically stable.
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OPTIMAL (EQUILIBRIUM) TARGETING STRATEGIES
As we show in appendix, we can derive explicitly Nash equilibrium strategies, both open loop and closed loop, for the two games specified in the preceding section. The closed-loop equilibrium-targeted expenditures, respectively for the finite-and infinite-time horizon, are given by
The open-loop equivalent expenditures are given by
The equilibrium strategies contained in equations (13) through (16) can all be relevant optimal strategies for firms practicing targeted promotions. If a firm has a short planning horizon, strategies in equations (13) and (15) are more relevant. However, if a firm has a long planning horizon, strategies in equations (14) and (16) are more pertinent. In addition, the latter case often offers a good approximation to the former with much reduced complexity of computation. Open-loop strategies in equations (15) and (16) are better suited to capture the planning stages of promotions, whereas closed-loop strategies in equations (13) and (14) convey a better sense of dynamic competition. Interestingly, all these different strategies yield more or less similar managerial insights (various relationships between optimal promotional strategies are listed in Table  1 ), which we discuss next. 
Total targeted promotional expenditures 8. For instance, in the case of equation (7), the first derivative of the right-hand side with respect to x k is negative.
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND MANAGERIAL INSIGHTS
In a dynamic setting where both competing firms can use targeted promotions and can react to each other based on the history of their interactions, the allocation of a firm's promotional expenditures over time, both for the defensive and offensive purposes, is an important managerial decision that can be quite intractable to make. For instance, how should a firm adjust its targeted expenditures over time? Should a firm do what its rival does in terms of its strategic posture, focusing on customer acquisition or retention whenever its rival does? Or should a firm always focus on customer retention regardless of what competition does, as some experts apparently advocate (Reichheld and Sasser 1990) ? The answers to all these questions can be quite elusive without any normative modeling.
Our analysis provides an answer to each of these questions. Although our analysis of the differential game itself is complex and even somewhat serendipitous, our answers to all these questions turn out to be surprisingly simple and intuitive, which should enhance the practical applicability of our conclusions.
Determinants of Optimal Targeting Strategies
By analyzing the closed-loop strategies in equations (13) and (14), we can characterize how a firm can optimally engage its promotional expenditure for customer retention and acquisition.
Proposition 1: A firm's optimal defensive (offensive) promotional incentives increase (decrease) with its market share x k , with defensive (offensive) targeting effectiveness ρ ρ
( ), and with the value of market share (λ k t ( ) or q t e k rt Φ( ) in the infinite-time horizon case), but they decrease with the actual redemption rate of defensive (offensive) targeted promotions θ θ
Proposition 1 is intuitive but important. It essentially confirms the optimality of some instinctive managerial practices. When a firm has a larger (smaller) market share, ceteris paribus, its offensive (defensive) promotions generate less (more) a bang on sales, and hence the firm should rationally provide more incentives for customer retention (customer switching). Thus, one may observe at any point in time that a firm engages more resources in customer retention as its market share increases. The fact that any promotional incentives, defensive and offensive alike, should increase with respective targeting effective-
) perhaps explains why the Internet has spawned a rapid growth of corporate expenditures on targeted promotions (Booker and Krol 2002) . As the value of market share in our model is essentially customer profitability, our analysis thus warns against a widespread practice of implementing customer retention or acquisition programs "with little regard to customer profitability" ("Briefings" 2003) . Finally, any targeted promotional incentives should decrease with the actual redemption rate of specific targeted promotions, as a higher redemption rate reduces the unit profit margin at any given level of sales.
Open-loop strategies in equations (15) and (16) suggest similar managerial insights for promotional planning. The key difference between these two types of strategies is that a firm's planned promotional incentives are based on planned market shares, ( ) x t k , and expected redemption rates, defined analogously as ( )
. Indeed, these two types of strategies are related. In both finite-and infinite-time cases, we have from equations (13) and (14) or (15) and (16):
This analysis gives us the following proposition:
Proposition 2: A firm can implement its promotional strategies optimally by adjusting its planned promotional incentives to reflect the observed difference between actual and planned market shares, as well as between actual and planned redemption rates. If a firm's actual market share is larger (smaller) than planned and if actual redemption rates are lower than expected, the firm should adjust upward its planned incentives for its defensive (offensive) targeted promotions.
Proposition 2 goes one step further than proposition 1 in suggesting that it is an advisable practice to adjust planned promotional incentives for customer acquisition and retention in accordance with how the planned market share and redemption rate are fulfilled. This two-stage adjustment process is more actionable, demanding less information to implement.
Strategic Orientation
We can also shed light on the general orientation of a firm's promotional strategies, as measured by the ratio of the firm's total defensive and offensive promotional expenditures. From equations (13) and (14), we have
Then, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3: A firm should be defense oriented (offense oriented), spending more on customer retention (switching) if its overall market share is larger than its rival's, weighted by its targeting effectiveness in respective markets. Furthermore, a firm should become more defense oriented (offense oriented) as its market share increases (decreases). Thus, a smaller (larger) share firm may optimally choose to focus on customer retention (acquisition), instead of customer acquisition (retention).
Intuitively, the size of a firm's market share, not just the effectiveness of the firm's defensive or offensive targetingthe commonly recognized factor-should be an important factor for determining the firm's strategic orientation. As a firm's market share increases, it should increase its expenditure on defensive targeting both because customer acquisition is less effective in generating sales and because customer retention helps to fend off more aggressive customer switching from the rival. In the case of a decrease in market share, a firm should increase its expenditure on offensive targeting to take advantage of the rival's vulnerability and to build up its market share, as is often done in practice. Thus, Proposition 3 suggests that the competing firms are engaging in a tug-of-war in which more offensive expenditure by one firm triggers more defensive expenditure by the other. Proposition 3 also suggests that a firm's strategic orientation should indeed depend critically on the relative effectiveness of targeted promotions. Everything else being equal, if a firm is more effective in using offensive (defensive) targeted promotions to increase its market share, it should spend more on customer switching (retention). This means that a firm should spend relatively more on the type of promotion that increases the firm's market share the most.
Interestingly, as a firm's short-term strategic orientation depends on its market share as well as its relative targeting effectiveness, the sweeping strategic prescription that all firms or all larger share firms should focus on customer retention can be misleading. Proposition 3 points out that a smaller (larger) market share firm can optimally choose to focus on customer retention (acquisition) if targeting own (rival's) customers is significantly more effective or less costly for the firm.
Similarly, we can take advantage of our analytical solutions and examine many other equilibrium relationships. In general, the relative targeted expenditure for a specific group of consumers depends only on the relative targeting effectiveness and on the relative value of market share increase for the competing firms. If we compare firms' targeted expenditures across consumer groups, the relative expenditure also depends on the size of each consumer group.
Long-Run Market Share and Strategic Orientation
We can carry out the analysis of the long-run equilibrium by using equations (11) and (12) (relationships for optimal promotional strategies in steady state are listed in Table 2 ).
Note first that the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium requires
Let yk j = denote the relative unit profit margin, and define
Fruchter, Zhang / DYNAMIC TARGETED PROMOTIONS 9 This means a firm's long-run market share increases with its relative unit profit margin. The reason is that a higher unit profit margin due either to cost advantage (or perhaps consumer loyalty) will motivate a firm to spend more on targeted promotions and thus gain a higher market share in the long run.
It is also straightforward to show, by taking derivatives of a firm's steady-state market share with respect to a specific effectiveness measure, that a firm's long-run market share increases with its targeting effectiveness, both defensive and offensive. Thus, our model suggests that to gain the long-run market share advantage when targeted promotions are feasible, a firm should strive to boost its unit profit margin either by lowering cost or building consumer loyalty and to improve its targeting effectiveness.
Most important, we can shed some light on the relationship between a firm's long-run market share and its strategic orientation in targeted promotions, as measured by the firm's relative expenditure on defensive and offensive targeting. In steady state, we have
Let us define two more structural variables, Proposition 4: A focus on customer retention is not an optimal long-run strategy for all firms in a competitive context. A firm with a sufficiently large market share should focus on customer retention, whereas a firm with a sufficiently small market share should stress customer acquisition. This is the case regardless of whether or not the firm is more effective in targeting its current customers.
9
When market shares are more evenly divided, the optimal strategy for a firm is to focus more on customer acquisition. Thus, customer acquisition can be a long-term winning strategy for all firms in an industry.
Intuitively, a focus on defensive targeting is a sensible competitive strategy for a firm only if it faces a rival's intense offensive targeting, which is the case when the market shares are unevenly distributed. When the market shares are more or less evenly distributed, the rival exerts little offensive pressure, and a firm is better off reducing its defensive targeting. Consequently, the equilibrium cannot be sustained when both firms focus on customer retention through defensive targeting. These conclusions extend the main result in McGahan and Ghemawat (1994) that only one firm (i.e., the smaller market share firm) can profitably focus on customer acquisition, and they contrast with Erickson's (1993) conclusion that defensive and offensive promotions should be balanced in steady state. In our model, these two types of promotions are balanced for a firm only if its market share takes on a specific value.
To the extent that offensive targeting is the root cause for customer churning, Proposition 4 thus predicts that among industries where targeted promotions are feasible, > . There exists no stable long-run equilibrium in which both firms are more effective in defensive targeting. customer churning will be more severe in the industries in which competing firms are more equally matched, all else being equal.
Numerical Example
The trajectories of a firm's promotional strategy, market share, and profits over time can be illustrated through a numerical example. For this purpose, we set ρ ρ
, q k = q j = 500, x 11 (0) = 0.4, x 12 (0) = 0.2, x 21 (0) = 0.1, and x 22 (0) = 0.3.
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The results of our simulation are shown in Figures 2, 3 , and 4. Firm 2, with a smaller initial market share, aggressively pursues new customers through offensive targeted promotions at the start of the game. Over time, Firm 2 decreases its offensive expenditure and increases its defensive expenditure as its overall market share increase is due mostly to the increase in repeat purchases, which are below the steadystate level at the outset. Firm 1, in contrast, initially spends more on defensive targeting than on offensive targeting in an effort to maintain its large market share but becomes increasingly offense oriented as its market share (mostly repeat purchasers) is chipped away by the rival. In the long run, both firms spend more on customer switching 11 and share the market equally in the dynamic long-run equilibrium.
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In this dynamic process of gravitating toward the long-run market shares, Firm 1's profits decrease while Firm 2's increase, as shown in Figure 4 .
CONCLUSIONS
Targeted promotions are gaining popularity as a strategic marketing tool. Many firms across different service industries are embracing new information technologies and gearing up to build their own sophisticated consumer databases to improve their targeting accuracy. Our analysis thus addresses a timely managerial question of how a firm should use targeted promotions to achieve the strategic objectives of customer retention and acquisition. Our normative analysis enables us to identify the determinants of optimal targeting strategies and to characterize the optimal overall strategic posture for a firm's targeting programs:
• A firm's promotional incentives for customer retention (acquisition) should be related positively to its own (its rival's) market share, its targeting effective- 
FIGURE 4 Dynamics of Profitability
10. We chose ρ o = .0119, as in the Erickson (1992) and Fruchter and Kalish (1997) studies, and chose ρ d to satisfy the stability condition (24).
11. This is because we have tt k j 4 3 < < in this example.
12. The fact that the market is equally divided in steady state and each firm has one quarter of repeat and switching sales is due to the symmetry in this example. ness, and customer profitability but negatively to the redemption rate of its promotions.
• A firm can promote optimally by adjusting its planned promotional incentives to reflect the observed difference between actual and planned market shares, as well as between actual and planned redemption rates.
• A firm should spend more on customer retention if its market share is increasing but spend more on customer acquisition if its market share is decreasing.
• A focus on either customer retention or acquisition can be an optimal long-run strategy for a firm. A firm with a large market share should focus more on customer retention. Otherwise, it should focus on customer acquisition. Indeed, a focus on customer acquisition can be a winning business strategy for all competing firms if their market shares are similar, whereas a focus on customer retention is not.
• To build a long-run market share advantage in the age of information-intensive marketing, a firm should strive to improve its targeting effectiveness and increase its unit profit margin through, for instance, building customer loyalty or improving product quality.
Future research can extend our analysis in two major directions. First, the results from any differential game always hinge on the specification of the dynamics for state variables. Future research can explore the robustness of our conclusions by using different but equally plausible dynamics for state variables. The robustness can also be checked by extending our model to include more firms and allow for a variable market size. Such extension is especially important for addressing targeting issues related to growth industries. Second, our solutions are analytical, and they are well suited to empirical estimation if proper data are available. Such an empirical exercise can help to pin down the parameters in the model and provide more specific managerial guidance for practitioners in different industries.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we derive closed-loop Nash equilibrium strategies for both games specified in the second section. For these games, we proceed first to construct closed-loop strategies from the first-order necessary conditions for the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Then we prove that the closed-loop strategies we have proposed satisfy the Nash equilibrium conditions contained in equation (8). This approach avoids technical difficulties associated with the standard methods of deriving state-dependent Nash equilibrium strategies. The use of standard methods for the problems is intractable and a tricky task indeed. The procedure for determining the open-and closed-loop solutions for both finite-and infinite-time problems is described after we state our solutions formally in the following two theorems.
Theorem 1 (closed-loop strategies for the finite-time problem): Consider the differential game associated with equations (2), (5), and (6), where x k (t) is as in equation (7). Let
where λ k satisfies the following two-point boundary value problem (TPBVP):
with j ≠ k, k = 1, 2, and x x j k = − 1 . Then ( , , , )
forms a global Nash equilibrium closed-loop strategy of the above differential game, that is, it satisfies condition (8).
Proof. See Appendix C below. The open-loop strategies are given by (see Appendix A below)
are as in equation (19), and x k 1 is given by
Then, x k 2 is determined through x x x k k k 2 1 = − . We can now extend Theorem 1 to the case of an infinite-time horizon.
Theorem 2 (closed-loop strategies for the infinite-time problem): Consider the differential game associated with equation (10). Let Ψ( ) x satisfy the following differential equation: 
where
where Φ(t) satisfies the following initial value problem
with j ≠ k, k = 1, 2, x x j k = − 1 , and Φ is as in equation (21). Then( , , , )
forms a global Nash equilibrium closed-loop strategy of the differential game (10); that is, it satisfies the condition (8) 
where { } Φ, x k are as in (24), x k 1 is given by
and x k 2 is determined through x x x k k k 2 1 = − . We first describe the procedure for constructing the open-and closed-loop strategies for the differential games stated in Theorems 1 and 2. Then we prove that the closed-loop strategies we have constructed are Nash equilibrium solutions as stated in Theorems 1 and 2.
A. THE FINITE-TIME CASE
Step 1 (2), (5), and (6) becomes
Max q x T e q x t u t u t
The current-value Hamiltonian for player k for game (A2) is given by
where λ k is the current-value multiplier associated with the state equation. The necessary optimality conditions for player k's open-loop strategies are given by the maximization condition (cf. Kamien and Schwartz 1991) ,
and the adjoint equations with the terminal conditions
From (A4), we have
Plugging (A6) into (A5) and the state equation, we obtain the following two-point boundary value problem (TPBVP):
where j ≠ k, k = 1, 2. Plugging (A6) into the state equation (5), we obtain
Considering (A7), we find the open-loop solutions to be
In Appendix C, we prove that the closed-loop strategies defined in (A14) are Nash equilibrium strategies; that is, they satisfy condition (8).
B. THE INFINITE-TIME CASE
Then, as T → ∞, the two equations in (A7) for λ k can be transformed into only one equation,
Equation (B2) follows immediately by substituting (B1) and its derivative with respect to t into the equations for λ k in (A7). From (B2), as before, we obtain Φ(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, ∞), which is a simple consequence of the terminal condition in (B2) and the property ( )
derived from (B2).
In conclusion, the TPBVP (A7) is now reduced to
where j ≠ k, k = 1, 2. Note that reducing a TPBVP from two end points to one end point reduces significantly the complexity of computation.
Now we want to take another step in reducing the complexity of computation. Let
and suppose
Then Ψ( ) x satisfies the following differential equation: 
.
Now, substituting in λ from equation (19), we obtain 0 0 (2) and rearranging, we obtain 
Or, 
In particular, 
Considering (C8) and (C9), we have 
Therefore, , . This completes the proof of our theorem.
D. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove this theorem, we proceed exactly as in Theorem 1, with the exception that, instead of the zero-sum (C1), we consider the zerosum
where Φ(t) is as in equation (24) or (B9), and x k is as in equations (7) and (10).
